Random Fixed Points, Limits and Systemic risk by Kavitha, Veeraruna et al.
Random Fixed Points, Limits and Systemic risk
1Veeraruna Kavitha, 1Indrajit Saha and 2Sandeep Juneja
1IEOR, IIT Bombay, and 2TIFR Mumbai, India
ABSTRACT
We consider vector fixed point (FP) equations in large di-
mensional spaces involving random variables, and study their
realization-wise solutions. We have an underlying directed
random graph, that defines the connections between various
components of the FP equations. Existence of an edge be-
tween nodes i, j implies the i-th FP equation depends on
the j-th component. We consider a special case where any
component of the FP equation depends upon an appropriate
aggregate of that of the random ‘neighbour’ components.
We obtain finite dimensional limit FP equations (in a much
smaller dimensional space), whose solutions approximate
the solution of the random FP equations for almost all re-
alizations, in the asymptotic limit (number of components
increase). Our techniques are different from the traditional
mean-field methods, which deal with stochastic FP equa-
tions in the space of distributions to describe the station-
ary distributions of the systems. In contrast our focus is
on realization-wise FP solutions. We apply the results to
study systemic risk in a large financial heterogeneous net-
work with many small institutions and one big institution,
and demonstrate some interesting phenomenon.
1. INTRODUCTION
Random fixed points (FPs) are generalization of classical
deterministic FPs, and arise when one considers systems
with uncertainty. Broadly one can consider two types of
such fixed points. There is considerable literature that con-
siders stochastic FP equations on the space of probability
distributions (e.g., [3, 4]). These equations typically arise as
a limit of some iterative schemes, or as asymptotic (station-
ary) distribution of stochastic systems. Alternatively, one
might be interested in sample path wise FPs (e.g., [5, 6]).
For each realization of the random quantities describing the
system, we have one deterministic FP equation. These kind
of equations can arise when the performance/status of an
agent depends upon that of a number of other agents. For
example, a financial network with any given liability graph
is affected by individual/common random economic shocks
received by the agents. The amount cleared (full/fraction
of liability) by an agent depends upon: a) the shocks it re-
ceives; and b) the liabilities cleared by the other agents. Our
primary focus in this paper is on the second type of equa-
tions. Existing literature primarily considers the existence of
measurable FP, given the existence of realization-wise FPs
(e.g., [5, 6]). In [6] (and reference therein) authors consider
the idea of random proximity points.
To the best of our knowledge, there are no (common) tech-
niques that provide ‘good’ solutions to (some special types
of) these equations. We consider a special type of FP equa-
tions, which are quite common, and provide a procedure to
compute the approximate solutions. We have FP equations
in which the performance/status of an agent is influenced
only by the aggregate performance/status of its neighbours.
A random graph describes the neighbours, while a set of
FP equations (one per realization of the random quantities)
describe the performance vectors. The key idea is to study
these FPs, asymptotically as the number of agents increase.
Towards this, we first study the aggregate influence factors,
with an aim to reduce the dimensionality of the problem.
But due to random connections, the aggregate influence fac-
tors can also depend upon the nodes. However the aggre-
gates might converge towards the same limit (e.g., as in law
of large numbers). We precisely consider such scenarios and
show that the random FPs converge to that of a limit system,
under certain conditions. The performance of the agents
in the limit system, depends upon finitely many ’aggregate’
limits. We could also obtain closed form expressions for
approximate solutions of some examples.
The mean field theory (MFT) is close to this approach: MFT
approximates many body problem with a one body prob-
lem and our result is also similar in nature. However there
are significant differences. The mean field theory also deals
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with a system of large number of agents, wherein the state/behaviour
of an individual agent is influenced by its own (previous)
state and the mean (aggregate) field seen by it (e.g., [7] and
reference therein). The mean field is largely described in
terms of occupation (empirical) measures representing the
fraction of agents in different states. The theory shows the
convergence of the state trajectories as well as the stationary
(time limit) distributions of the original system towards that
of a limit deterministic system. The stationary distribution
can be described by FP equations in the space of distribu-
tions (e.g., [7]). While we directly have a set of FP equa-
tions, which are defined realization-wise and depend upon
the realization-wise ‘mean’ performance. Further, as al-
ready mentioned the mean influence factor is not common
to all the agents. In [8] and references therein, authors con-
sider the mean field analysis with ‘random’ aggregate influ-
ence factors like in our case. They consider the first-order
approximation, wherein the joint expected values are ap-
proximated by the product of the marginal expected values
etc. Thus the moments of the joint distributions represent-
ing the FP solutions are asymptotically proven to be product
of marginal moments. Some authors also consider second-
order approximations or moment closure techniques, where
the joint states of triplets are assumed to have a specific dis-
tribution (see [8] for relevant discussions).ur FP solutions
are also proved to be asymptotically independent, however
the asymptotic solutions are independent (infinite dimen-
sional) random vectors.
We consider FP equations with possibly multiple solutions.
We show that any sequence of the chosen FPs, converges
to the unique FP of the limit system almost surely under
sufficiently general conditions.
We apply our results to study the systemic risk in a large
financial network with many financial institutions. The in-
stitutions borrow/lend money from/to other institutions, and
will have to clear their obligations at a later time point. These
systems are subjected to economic shocks, because of which
some entities default (do not clear their obligations). Be-
cause of interdependencies, this can lead to further defaults
and the cascade of these reactions can lead to (partial/full)
collapse of the system. After the financial crisis of 2007-
2008, there is a surge of activity towards studying systemic
risk (e.g., [10],[9],[11]). The focus in these papers has been
on several aspects including, measures to capture systemic
risk, influence of network structure on systemic risk, phase
transitions etc. These papers primarily discuss homogeneous
systems, although heterogeneity is a crucial feature of real
world networks. As already mentioned the clearing vec-
tors are represented by FP equations and may have multi-
ple FP solutions. Thus our asymptotic solution can be use-
ful in this context. We consider one stylized example of
heterogeneous financial network, that of one big bank and
numerous small banks. Our key contribution is that we de-
velop a methodology to arrive at simplified asymptotic rep-
resentation to large bank networks. This allows easy res-
olution of many practical what-if scenarios. For instance,
in a simple framework we observe that having a big bank
in an economy well connected to the small banks can sta-
bilize the small banks even when the big bank itself faces
shocks. However, the reverse may not be true. The proposed
methodology can be similarly used to provide insights into
many other practical scenarios. We analyze these in future.
To summarise, our analysis helps identify important patterns
in a complex structure, since the structure simplifies when
large number of constituents are involved.
2. SYSTEM MODEL
Consider a random graph with n+1 vertices {1, 2, · · · , n, b}
whose directed edges, given by random weights {Wi,j},
represent the influence factors. The node b is a ‘big node’,
and is highly influential. There is an edge between any two
of the ‘small’ nodes (nodes in {1, 2, · · · , n}) with probabil-
ity pss independently of the others and let {Ii,j}i≤n,j≤n be
the corresponding indicators. Then the weights from a small
node j are the fractions1 defined as below:
Wj,b = η
sb
j and Wj,i =
Ij,i(1− ηsbj )∑
i′≤n Ij,i′
, (1)
where {ηsbj }j are IID (independent, identically distributed)
random variables with values between 0, 1. These fractions,
for example, can represent random fractions of some re-
sources shared between various nodes. From small node
j, there is a dedicated fraction ηsbj towards the b-node while
the remaining (1 − ηsbj ) fraction is equally shared by the
other connected small nodes. The weights from b-node are
the fractions,
Wb,j =
ηbsj∑
i η
bs
i
,
where {ηbsj }j are IID random variables again. We are in-
terested in some performance of the nodes, which depends
upon the weighted average of the performance of other nodes
with weights as given by {Wi,j}.We consider the following
fixed point (FP) equation (in Rn+1) constructed using func-
tions (fs, fb), which in turn depend upon weighted aver-
ages {X¯si }i and X¯b, and whose FP (i-th component) repre-
sents important performance measure of the nodes (node-i)
as below:
Xsi = f
s(Gi, X¯
s
i , η
bs
i X
b) for each i ≤ n, (2)
Xb = fb(X¯b) with aggregates (3)
X¯si :=
∑
j≤n
XsjWj,i and X¯b :=
1
n
∑
j≤n
XsjWj,b.
In the above, {Gi} is an IID sequence and the performance
of the big node Xb is defined per small node (performance
divided by n). For any n define mapping f := (fb, fs, · · · fs),
with x := xn := (xn1 , xn2 , · · · , xnn), component wise:
1Note that
∑
iWj,i +Wj,b = 1 for all j.
f1(x, xb) := f
b(x¯b), x¯b :=
1
n
∑
j≤n
xjWj,b and
fi(x, xb) := f
s(Gi, x¯i, η
bs
i xb), x¯i :=
∑
j≤n
xjWj,i ∀i > 1,
which represents the FP of the random operator (2)-(3). We
assume the following:
A.1 The functions fs, fb are non-negative, continuous and
are bounded by an y <∞,
0 ≤ fs(g, x, xb), fb(xb) ≤ y for all g, x, xb.
Under the above assumption, by well known Brouwers fixed
point theorem, FP solution exists for almost all realizations
of {Gi}, {Wj,i} and for any xb. Thus we have a random
(measurable) FP (X∗, X∗b ) for each n for the random oper-
ator (2)-(3) (see [5]). To be precise we have:
LEMMA 1. For any n define mapping f := (fb, fs, · · · fs),
with x := xn := (xn1 , x
n
2 , · · · , xnn), component wise:
f1(x, xb) := f
b(x¯b), x¯b :=
1
n
∑
j≤n
xjWj,b and
fi(x, xb) := f
s(Gi, x¯i, η
bs
i xb), x¯i :=
∑
j≤n
xjWj,i ∀i > 1.
Each component is a mapping from [0, y]n+1 → [0, y] for
almost all {Gi}, {Wj,i} and for any xb. Further by con-
tinuity of f , we have a deterministic fixed point for almost
all {Gi} and {Ij,i} under A.1. Then we have (almost sure)
random fixed point (X∗, X∗b ) for each n (see [5]). 
Assumptions on the graph structure: We require that the
number of nodes influencing any given node, grows asymp-
totically linearly for almost all sample paths:
A.2 Consider pss > 0, and only graphs for which,
lim
n→∞
∑
j≤n
∣∣∣∣ 1∑
i Ij,i
− 1
npss
∣∣∣∣ = 0 almost surely (a.s.), for any i.
2.1 Aggregate fixed points
One can rewrite the fixed point equations for the weighted
averages {X¯si }i, X¯b and we begin with their analysis. De-
fine the following random variables, that depend upon real
constants (x, xb):ξi(x, xb) := fs(Gi, x, ηbsi xb), (4)
and assume:
A.3 |ξi(x, xb)−ξi(u, ub)| ≤ σ(|x−u|+|xb−ub|) with σ ≤ 1.
Consider the following operators on infinite sequence space2
s∞, one for each n:
2 Here s∞ is the space (subset) of bounded sequences
equipped with l∞ norm |x¯|∞ := supi |xi|,
s∞ := {x¯ = (x1, x2, · · · ) : xi ∈ [0, y] for all i}.
f¯n(x¯, x¯b) = (f¯
n
b , f¯
n
1 , f¯
n
2 · · · ) where (5)
f¯ni (x¯, x¯b) =
{ ∑
j≤n ξj(x¯j , xb)Wj,i if i ≤ n
0 else,
f¯nb (x¯, x¯b) :=
1
n
∑
j≤n
ξj(x¯j , xb)Wj,b with xb := fb(x¯b).
It is clear that the fixed points of the above operators equal
the aggregate vectors, ({X¯si }i≤n, X¯b). Define the ’limit’
operator f¯∞(x¯, x¯b) = (f¯∞b , f¯
∞
1 , f¯
∞
2 · · · ):
f¯∞i (x¯, x¯b) := lim sup
n
f¯ni (x¯, x¯b) for all i ∈ {b, 1, 2, · · · }. (6)
The idea is to show that the fixed point of this operator
equals that of a ‘limit’ system and that the fixed points of the
original system converge towards these fixed points. Recall
that the weights sum up to one, i.e.,
∑
iWj,i = 1 for any i.
Thus we require the fixed point of the operator:
f¯n where fn : [0, y]× s∞ → [0, y]× s∞,
where the s∞ is defined in footnote 2. Idea is to derive
a kind of mean field analysis where the aggregates will be
approximated by their expected values.
When we consider constant sequence, i.e., if x¯ = (x¯, x¯, · · · )
the limit superiors in the definition of the limit system f¯∞
are actually limits by A.2 and Law of large numbers (LLN)
and equal (with xb as in (5))
f¯∞i (x¯, x¯b)=EGi,ηbsi
[ξi(x¯, xb)] (1− E[ηsb1 ]) and
f¯∞b (x¯, x¯b)=EGi,ηbsi
[ξi(x¯, xb)]E[η
sb
1 ]. (7)
In the above, EX,Y represents the expectation with respect
to X,Y . The random variables are IID and hence the first
equation is the same function for all i. By Theorem 1, given
below, one such constant sequence would be the almost sure
limit of the solutions of the aggregate fixed point equations
(5). Thus one will have to solve a two-dimensional fixed
point equation corresponding to the above function (7). And
then random fixed points (2)-(3) are asymptotically indepen-
dent depending upon the other nodes only via the aggregate
fixed point, as given by the theorem below.
THEOREM 1. Assume either 0 < E[ηsb1 ] < 1 or σ < 1
in A.3. The aggregates of the random system, which are FPs
of (4)-(5), denoted by (X¯∗, X¯∗b )(n) := ({X¯si }i, X¯∗b )(n)
converge as n→∞:
X¯si → x¯∞∗ for all i and X¯∗b → x¯∞∗b almost surely (a.s.),
where (x¯∞∗b , x¯
∞∗) with x¯∞∗ := (x¯∞∗, x¯∞∗, · · · ) is the
FP of the limit system given by (7). Further (any sequence
of) FPs of the original system (2)- (3) converge almost surely:
Xb(n) → X∞∗b := fb(x¯∞∗b ) as n→∞ and (8)
Xsi (n) → fs(Gi, x¯∞∗, ηbsi X∞∗b ). 
Proof: The proof is provided in section 5. 
Thus the fixed points of the finite n system converge to that
of the limit system. The fixed points are asymptotically in-
dependent and depend upon the other nodes only via an al-
most sure constant x¯∞∗i which is common for all i. Another
important point to observe here is that, the aggregate fixed
points need not be unique, however any sequence of fixed
points (one for each n) converges towards that of the limit
system (when it has unique fixed point).
Remarks: Another interesting observation is that the result
does not depend upon the precise probability pss of the con-
nection between small nodes. It only depends upon the fact
that every node can potentially influence every other node
directly or indirectly (i.e., pss > 0). It is straight forward
to generalize to the case where {Ii,j} are any IID random
variables and the weights are formed in a similar way. Fur-
ther one may have finite number of groups of small nodes,
nodes within a group are identical stochastically (identical
{Gi}, {ηsbi } and {ηbsi }), and any typical small node can be
of group i with probability qi independent of others. With
this one can study a wider variety of heterogeneous situ-
ations. For example one can consider a financial network
with many big and small banks. One can also generalize
to the case when we have more than one (but finite) dis-
tinct limits for the aggregate fixed points. The results are
true even when {Xsi } are finite dimensional, with dimen-
sion greater than one. One can then consider banks with
different levels of connectivity.
3. FINANCIAL NETWORK
Consider a huge financial network with n small banks and
one big bank. The assets (shares, bonds etc.) of the big bank
are large compared to any small bank and the small banks
are similar in nature. At time T = 0 the banks invest in a
project by taking loans from one another or from outside the
financial network. At time T = 1, the banks anticipate some
returns from their investments, which is used to clear their
obligations (e.g., [11, 9]). But the investments are risky,
there are chances of economic shocks, the returns might be
lower than anticipated, because of which some banks may
not be able to (fully/partially) pay the liability. We say these
banks defaulted. The defaulted banks increase the shocks to
other connected banks, because of which we may have more
defaults. And this can continue and the system can ‘col-
lapse’. Systemic risk precisely studies these aspects. The
defaulted banks break the bonds, those that they invested
at time T = 0, and try to clear their obligations using the
partial returns obtained after breaking. At the end of sec-
ond time period T = 2 the survived banks obtain a return
As (respectively nAb for the big bank) while the defaulted
ones obtain obtain ρsAs/ρbnAb (at time period T = 1)
where ρs/ρb < 1 (usually much less than 1).Our main aim
is to study the influence of economic shocks on the stability
of the network, wherein stability is understood in terms of
the fraction of defaults, for a given realization of the shocks
or in terms of the expected surplus after the shocks etc.
Liabilities: We model the financial network using a directed
weighted graph, with the banks as the nodes and the weighted
edges represent the liability fractions and directions. The
weight Wi,j := li,j/Yi represents the fraction of the liabil-
ity, where li,j is the amount the bank i is liable to bank j and
Yi :=
∑
j li,j + li,b is the total liability of the small bank i.
The small banks are liable to big bank with proportionality
factors {ηsbi }i and, a small bank is liable to another small
bank with probability pss > 0. Let Ii,j be 1 if small bank
i is liable to small bank j and then the fractions of liability
would be: Wi,j :=
Ii,j(1− ηsbi )∑
j′ Ii,j′
and Wi,b = ηsbi .
The fraction of liability of big bank towards small bank i
equals Wb,i = ηbsi /η¯, and Wb,o = η
o/η¯ is the fraction
that it is liable to sources outside the network, with η¯ :=∑
j≤n η
bs
j + nη
o. Let nY b represent the total liability of
big bank.
Shocks: Let Ksi be the amount of money small bank i is
expecting as return (plus its liquid cash) at time T = 1,
let Zsi represent the individual/independent shock experi-
enced by small bank i, and let Zc represent the shock that
is commonly received by all the small banks. The big bank
receives a shock of magnitude nδZc along with its indepen-
dent shock nZb. After the shocks the small bank i receives
(Ksi − Zc − Zsi )+ at T = 1 while the big bank receives
n(Kb − δZc − Zb)+, where nKb is the shock free return
anticipated at time T = 1.
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Figure 1: First sub-figure: only BB defaults; Second sub-figure: only SBs default; Third sub-figure: both default.
Clearing Vectors: Let Xsi represent the maximum possible
part of the total liability, eventually cleared by small bank i,
and letXb (per small bank) represent the same for big bank.
The vector (Xb, {Xsi }s) is referred to as clearing vector
(e.g., [11, 9]) and we make the following commonly made
assumptions (as in [11, 9] etc.) for computing the same.
When a bank (say bank i) defaults, it may not be able to
clear its liabilities completely. However it repays the maxi-
mum possible, and the amount cleared to another bank (say
bank j) is proportional to the fractionWi,j . Thus small bank
i receives X¯si :=
∑
jWj,iX
s
j at time period T = 1 when
the other small banks try to clear their liabilities. In a simi-
lar way, it receives XbWb,i from big bank. It also receives
(Ksi − Zc − Zsi )+ at time period T = 1 (after shock) from
outside investments. The liabilities are paid, only after pay-
ing the operational costs/taxes vs (nvb for big bank). Thus
the bank i at maximum can clear ((Ksi − Zc − Zsi )+ +
X¯si − vs)+ and if this amount is less than Yi it breaks its
bonds which are supposed to mature at time period T = 2.
The amount cleared by big bank is also computed in a sim-
ilar manner. Thus, in all, the total amount cleared by small
bank i and big bank respectively equals,
Xsi = min
{
Φsi (X¯
s
i , X
b), Yi
}
, and
Xb =
1
η¯
min
{
nΦb(X¯b), nY b
}
with aggregates
X¯b =
∑
j≤nX
s
jWj,b
n
, X¯si :=
∑
j
Wj,iX
s
j , where
Φsi (X¯
s
i , X
b):=
(
(Ksi − Zc − Zsi )+ + X¯si + ρsAs + ηbsi Xb − vs
)+
,
Φb(X¯b):=
(
(Kb − Zcδ − Zb)+ + ρbAb − vb + X¯b
)+
.
By Law of large numbers (LLN), η¯/n → E[ηbs] + ηo
a.s. The rest of the system is exactly like the general sys-
tem (2)-(3), for any given realization of (Zc, Zb,Kb, Y b).
Assumptions A.1 and A.3 are clearly satisfied and Theo-
rem 1 is applicable if we assume A.2. By Theorem 1 and
equation (7), for any given realization (Zc, Zb,Kb, Y b) =
(zc, zb, k
b, yb), the aggregate vectors are approximately (ac-
curate for large n) the solutions of the following fixed point
equations:
x¯∞∗=EZi,Yi,Ki,ηsbi
[
min
{
Φsi (x¯
∞∗, x∞∗b ), Yi
}]
(1− E[ηsb1 ]),
x¯∞∗b =x¯
∞∗ E[η
sb
1 ]
1− E[ηsb1 ]
, x∞∗b =
min
{
Φb(x¯∞∗b ), y
b
}
E[ηbs1 ] + η
o
. (9)
Once these fixed point equations are solved, the clearing
vectors are approximately given by (8) of Theorem 1. These
are asymptotically independent, as now the aggregates X¯si
are almost sure constants and are common for all i. We now
compute relevant asymptotic performance measures.
3.1 Performance measure to study Sys-
temic risk
Once these fixed point are available for each pair of shock,
initial value, total liability realizations (kb, yb, zc, zb), one
can obtain various performance measures as below:
1) Expected surplus till time T = 1 per small bank: This is
the total income of the network (big bank as well as small
banks) after paying away the liabilities and taxes (v) divided
by number of small banks. We are currently using the fol-
lowing expression which has to be proved as in [11, 9]
E[S(1)]:=E
[
(Ψs)+ + (Ψs + ρsAs)+ ; Ψs < 0
]
+(Ψb)+ +
(
Ψb + ρbAb
)+
1{Ψb<0}, with
Ψsi :=(K
s
i − Zc − Zsi )+ + x¯∞∗ + x∞∗b ηbsi − vs − Y si
Ψb :=(Kb − Zcδ − Zb)+ + x¯∞∗ E[η
sb
1 ]
1− E[ηsb1 ]
−vb − Y b. (10)
The expectations are with respect to (Zi, ηbsi , Yi,K
s
i ) and
are conditioned over (Kb, Zc, Zb, Y b).
2) Expected number of defaults: The fraction of small banks
that defaulted (by bounded convergence theorem) and the
indicator that the big bank defaults asymptotically equal:
P sD:=P (Ψ
s
i (x¯
∞∗, x∞∗b ) < Yi) , P
b
D:=1{Ψb(x¯∞∗
b
)<yb}a.s. (11)
3) Expected surplus till time T = 2 per small bank: The banks
invest and the liability structure is defined at time period
T = 0. The first installment is returned to the banks at
T = 1 (as in [11, 9]) and we are studying the situation when
there are shocks to these returns. The surplus per small bank
till time period T = 1 is given by E[S(1)]. The banks that
defaulted at time T = 1, break their bonds/investments. If
this did not happen a small bank receives amountAs on ma-
turity at T = 2, while the big bank receives nAb amount (if
it did not default). Thus the surplus at T = 2 equals:
E[S(2)] = E[S(1)] + (1− P sD)As + (1− P bD)Ab. (12)
Regular networks: In these networks, the total claim of any
bank equals its total liability, i.e.,
∑
j lji+lbi =
∑
j lij+lib
for all i. We consider these networks for further study, as
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Figure 2: Small bank-major shocks (Zi ∼ Bin(0.4, 8)), big bank-minor shocks (Zc = 2, Zb = 2) connection with big
bank (best at 0.9778) improves the surplus.
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Figure 3: When big bank has major shocks (Zc = 2, Zb = 8), risk of small bank is minor (Zi ∼ Bin(0.2, 2)).
Connection with big bank does not help, surplus at pbs = 0 equals that at pbs = 1.
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Figure 4: With big common shock, setting as in Figure 3 but for zc = 8. Now the connection with big bank improves
the performance as in Figure 2. The improvement is more pronounced, but big-bank performance remains the same.
they ensure the initial wealth3 of the network remains the
same once the characteristics of Kb,Ks, Zi, Zc, Zb remain
the same (stochastically). This allows fair comparison of
stability of the network for different values of the param-
eters, importantly the big bank-small bank connection pa-
rameter E[ηsb]. In our network the liabilities are random
and equal:
lji = Yj
Iji(1− ηsbj )∑
i′ Ij,i′
, ljb = ηsbj Yj and lbj =
1
η¯
ηbsj nY
b.
Thus clearly
∑
i lji + ljb = Yj , and as n → ∞ by LLN
and A.2 ([?, Section 5])∑
i
lij =
∑
i
Yi
Ii,j(1− ηsbi )∑
j Ii,j
→ E[Yi]E[1− ηsbi ], thus
∑
i
lij + lbj → E[Yi](1− E[ηsbi ]) +
1
E[ηbs] + ηo
ηbsj Y
b.
Since the liabilities are random, we require equality in stochas-
tic sense or atleast in expected sense (m=), i.e., we need:
E[Yi](1− E[ηsbi ]) +
1
E[ηbs] + ηo
ηbsi Y
b m= Yi
We also need that the liabilities and claims of the big bank
match, i.e.,
∑
j lbj =
∑
j ljb. That is we need (at limit),
lim
n→∞
∑
j lbj
n
= lim
n→∞
∑
j η
bs
j
nE[ηbs] + ηo
Y b
m
= lim
n→∞
∑
j η
sb
j Yj
n
.
3.2 Example Case studies
We consider two scenarios of regular networks and compute
the performance measures (10)-(12).
3.3 No external links, ηo = 0
To keep things simple yet sufficiently interesting, we con-
sider a deterministic Y si ≡ y, Y b ≡ yb and Ksi ≡ ks. We
then consider a given scenario (zc, zb, kb) as discussed be-
fore. This is the case with identical small banks in terms
of initial wealth, investments at time T = 0 and when they
receive common shock zc as well individual independent
shocks {Zsi }. The total shock of the big bank equals δzc +
zb. To have regular networks we set:ηbsi
d
= η bi and y
b = yE[ηbs] for all i,
and so E[ηsbi ] = E[η
bs
i ] = pbs. We immediately have
the following for the limit system when ηbsi are indicators.
Let ks, k
s
respectively represent the worst and best returns
((ksi − zc − Zsi )+) of a small bank, given zc. Then
LEMMA 2. (i) If ypbs ≤
(
ks − vs) then none of the
small banks default, i.e, P sD = 0.
3This is proportional to the amount anticipated without
shocks at time T = 1 plus the amount anticipated by the
returns from other banks minus the amount it has to pay to
other banks, all at time T = 1. For small banks and big
bank (per small bank) it is proportional respectively to:
Ksi +
∑
j
lj,i+ lb,i−
∑
j
li,j− li,b and Kb+
∑
j
lj,b−
∑
j
lb,j .
(ii) If ypbs >
(
k
s
+ x∞∗b − vs
)
, then all small banks default,
i.e., P sD = 1. Thus if ypbs >
(
k
s
+ y − vs), then P sD = 1.
(iii) If 0 < ypbs <
(
k
s
+x∞∗b − vs
)
, then atleast some small
banks do not default, as P sD ≤ 1− (1− w)pbs < 1.
Proof: The small banks never default if for all scenarios
(realizations of Zi, ηbsi ):
(ks − zc − Zi)+ + y(1− pbs)− vs + ηbsi xb ≥ y.
The worst scenario is with worst shock ks and with ηbsi = 0
and hence P sD = 0 when ypbs ≤ ks − vs proving (i). In a
similar way consider the best scenario to obtain part (ii). 
Thus we identified the conditions for zero and all defaults.
As long as pbs < (ks − vs)/y, none of the small banks
default. But (for example) when pbs increases beyond (ks−
vs)/y, there can be a ‘phase transition’ in the fraction of
defaults, P sD . At this point it probably would jump from 0 to
some non-zero value. One need more analysis to understand
this possible ‘phase transition’. We derive more such details
for the special case with binary shocks.
Consider that Zi ∼ Bin(w, ), i.e., binary (0, ) shocks with
P (Zi = ) = w. Then ks = (ks − zc − )+ and ks =
(ks − zc)+.
With two time periods
We begin with analysis with two time period, T = 0, 1.
Thus ρs ρb and As Ab are not applicable. We compute only
the expected fraction of defaults. We have the closed form
expressions for the clearing vectors as well as the asymp-
totic fraction of defaults, for the sub-case when the big bank
does not default. These expressions approximately equal
the corresponding quantities for system with large number
of small banks.
When the big bank does not default
LEMMA 3. Let y > . With binary shocks, the a.s. limit
fraction of defaults equal (with K¯sZ := E[(k
s− zc−Zi)+]):
P sD(pbs) =

PD1
PD2
PD3
PD4
PD5
=

0 if b0 < ypbs ≤ b1
w(1− pbs) if b1 < ypbs ≤ b2
1− pbs if b2 < ypbs ≤ b3
1− pbs(1− w) if b3 < ypbs ≤ b4
1 else,
with,
bi := ci(1− pbs)PDi + di(1− (1− pbs)PDi), i > 0, b0 = 0,
c1
c2
c3
c4
=

0
ks − vs
K¯sZ − vs
K¯sZ(1−pbs)+(ks+y)wpbs
1−pbs(1−w) − v
s
 ,

d1
d2
d3
d4
=

ks − vs
k
s − vs
ks − vs + y
k
s − vs + y
.
Let b5 := y, c5 := K¯sZ − vs + ypbs and PD5(pbs) = 1.
The common clearing aggregate (when bi−1 < ypbs < bi):
x¯s
∞ = y(1− pbs)−
(ypbs − ci) (1− pbs)PDi(pbs)
1− (1− pbs)PDi(pbs)
∀i ≤ 5.
The above is true when the big bank does not default, i.e., if
(kb − δzc − zb)+ − vb + x¯s∞
pbs
1− pbs
> ypbs. 
Proof : is available in Appendix, in pages 9-10. 
The above result indicates the ‘phase transitions’ with re-
spect to the connection parameter pbs. This lemma is true
for the sub-case when big bank does not default (one exam-
ple scenario, when (kb − δzc − zb)+ − vb > y). However
some of the ‘phase transition’ results mentioned below are
also true for the other case, by Lemma 2.
As already discussed when the connectivity parameter pbs
is below b1/y, the network of all small banks remains stable
(the fraction of defaults is zero). But as soon as the connec-
tion parameter crosses b1/y = (ks− vs)/y the small banks
start defaulting, and we see a sharp jump of size (see PD1
and PD2 in Lemma 3):
w(1− pbs) = w(y − k
s + vs)
y
at exactly pbs =
ks − vs
y
.
These kind of phase-transitions can also be seen in Figures
1-5. When pbs is increased further, when it crosses the
threshold b2/y, P sD has another jump/phase-transition. At
pbs = b2/y, we notice a sharp jump of size (see PD2 and
PD3 in Lemma 3): (
1− b2
y
)
(1− w).
For this case, one needs to solve the equation (Lemma 3)
pbs =
b2
y
=
(ks − vs)(1− pbs)2w + (ks − vs)(1− (1− pbs)2w)
y
to get the exact point of phase transition. In a similar way
from Lemma 3, we see four possible phase transitions with
respect to parameter pbs. Since all the co-efficients also de-
pend upon the shock realizations (zc, zb) one can also ob-
tain phase transitions with respect to shock sizes. Same is
the case with other parameters.
More general observation from Lemma 3 is that, we have a
possibility of small fraction of defaults when pbs is near 0
(P sD can be 0) or when pbs is near 1 with b4 > 1 (P
s
D ∝
(1− pbs) or ∝ (1− pbs(1− w))). The coefficient b4 with
pbs close to one, approximately equals d4 = k
s − vs + y,
is mostly bigger than one. Thus either small connectivity
or large connectivity is better, but intermediate connectivity
may not be good. This can also be observed in the figures.
With three time periods
From equation (9), If ks + ρsAs > vs + ypbs then x¯∞∗ =
y(1−pbs) and further kb > δzc+zb+vb implies x∞∗b = y.
Thus the banks (small) may default, but they are able to clear
their obligations completely by breaking the bonds. One can
easily verify the following in this case.
LEMMA 4. Assume kb > δzc + zb + vb,  < y and
ks + ρsAs > vs + ypbs. Then
P sD =

w(1− pbs) if k
s−vs
y
< pbs ≤ k
s−vs
y
1− pbs if k
s−vs
y
< pbs ≤ k
s+y−vs
y
1− pbs + wpbs if k
s+y−vs
y
< pbs ≤ k
s
+y−vs
y
1 if k
s
+y−vs
y
< pbs.
Proof: When y >  (i.e., xb > ), k
s
< ks + xb and one
can derive the result considering various scenarios as in the
previous lemma. 
We continue with sub-case considered of Lemma 4 for which
P bD = 0. Define,
P ∗sD := inf
pbs
P sD,
the minimum ‘expected defaults’ possible. It is clear that for
the sub-case considered in Lemma 4 it equals the following:
P ∗sD = min
{
w
(
1− ks−vs)
y
)
, (v
s−ks)+
y
}
if vs < k
s
,
min
{
w + (1− w) vs−ks
y
, (v
s−ks)
y
, 1
}
if vs > k
s
.
Further the assumptions of Lemma 4 for any pbs = E[ηbs],
we have x¯∞∗ = y(1− pbs), x∞∗b = y, and hence
Ψs = (ks − zc − Zsi )+ + y(ηbsi − E[ηbs])− vs
and Ψb = ψb = kb − zcδ − zb − vb > 0. Further Ψs +
ρsAs ≥ 0 almost surely and thus from equations (10)-(12)
the expected surplus equals
E[S(2)] = E[Ψs + ρsAs; Ψs < 0 +As; Ψs ≥ 0] + ψb
= E[(ks − zc − Zsi )+]− vs +As − (1− ρs)AsP sD + ψb.
Therefore the expected surplus is maximized at the same
p∗bs which minimizes P
s
D and then the optimal surplus is
obtained by substituting P sD∗ in equation (12).
Influence of connectivity, shocks: We study the influence of
connectivity parameter pbs = E[ηbs] = E[ηsb] for various
shock scenarios. We begin with the case when pbs = 0+,
i.e., as pbs approaches 0 (or is ≈ 0). There is negligible
connection between the small banks and big bank, and the
small banks are primarily liable to other small banks. The
limit FP equations are: xb = 0+ and
x¯∞∗=E
[
min{(ks − zc − Zsi )+ + x¯∞∗+ ρsAs + ηbsi 0+ − vs, y}
]
.
When ks > vs, it is clear that x¯∞∗ = y, i.e., the small
banks do not default at pbs = 0+. If the big bank encoun-
ters big shock, i.e., if (kz−δzc−zb)+ < vb, then it defaults
near pbs = 0+. In fact from equation (9), the big bank de-
faults for any pbs > 0 under these conditions4. Therefore
we conclude, ‘when the big bank receives large shocks, it
always defaults, the connection with the small banks does
not help’. Further some of the small banks can also default
4 Clearly x¯∞∗ ≤ y(1− pbs), yb = y(1− pbs) and so xb < y.
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Figure 5: For different shock realizations: vs=vb=12,
Zi∼Bin(.4, 20), (y, kb, ks) = (80, 55, 25), (δ, pbs) = (.4, .9)
leading to an increased fraction of defaults as pbs increases.
We considered one such example in the first sub-figure of
Figure 1, which reaffirms our observation: the fraction of
defaults P sD = 0 for small pbs (till 0.1) and near pbs = 1.
The defaults are more for intermediate pbs.
We consider the reverse situation now. Say the big bank
does not default at pbs = 0+. This is because it received
small shocks such that (kz − δzc − zb)+ > vb. Say some
small banks receive big shocks such that ks < vs. Then
from Lemma 3, P sD ≥ w at pbs = 0+. The connection with
big bank can improve the fraction of defaults, for example,
if we manage to chose a large enough pbs which is between
b2/y and b3/y of Lemma 3 (and if further the big bank does
not default). In this case the asymptotic fraction of defaults
could be smaller than w. We consider one such example
in the second sub-figure of Figure 1. We notice that P sD
reduces as pbs increases beyond 0.8, in fact P sD = 0 (i.e, no
small bank defaults) at pbs = 1. Thus we conclude ‘the big
bank (with small shocks) can help the small banks’.
We consider a third example in Figure 1, where big bank and
some small banks receive big shocks to default at pbs = 0+.
The big bank continues to default at all pbs, however P sD
decrease with increase in pbs. Thus for the chosen example
of economy with one big bank and many small banks, ‘small
banks can be stabilized by connecting to big bank, even if
the later defaults, however they can’t help the big bank’.
Influence of shocks: The banks can face two types of shocks.
The idiosyncratic shocks ({Zsi }, Zb) are bank specific shocks,
while the common shock (Zc) affects all the banks. We aim
to study the role of magnitude of these shocks on the cascad-
ing of defaults in Figure 5 for a fixed pbs = 0.9. We observe
two phase transitions in the fraction of defaults, P sD remains
at 0.1 (1 − pbs) for some region of (Zb, Zc), jumps to 0.46
(1−pbs(1−w)) and then to 1, and, one phase transition with
respect to big bank. This behaviour can also be explained
using the barrier constants {bi} of Lemma 3, which depend
upon these shocks. One can observe significant sharp jumps
at the phase transition points, and these points are very im-
portant for any financial network. These jumps and tran-
sitions points can be studied either using Lemma 3 or by
studying the simplified FP equations (9) numerically.
Conclusions
We considered a random graph, with edges representing the
influence factors between a big (highly influential) node and
numerous small nodes. The performance/status of individ-
ual nodes is resultant of these influences, which are repre-
sented by fixed point (FP) equations. We showed that the
solution of the random FP equations converge almost surely
to that of a limit system and these solutions are asymptot-
ically independent. One may have multiple solutions for
finite graphs, however any sequence of them converge to
the unique FP of the limit system (if it has unique FP).
Thus we have a procedure to solve the large dimensional
FP equations, using mean-field kind of techniques. The pro-
posed solution requires solving of ’aggregate’ FPs in a much
smaller dimensional space and is accurate asymptotically.
The clearing vectors (the fraction of liabilities eventually
cleared) in a financial network are generally represented by
random FP equations and we studied the same using our re-
sults. We study an example heterogeneous financial network
with one big bank and many small banks. We have reduced
the overall economy problem in this set-up to a two node
problem - one big bank and one aggregate small bank, thus
facilitating big picture analysis. We observe some interest-
ing phase transitions, one can easily study the nature of these
phase transitions using the approximate solutions of the in-
volved FPs. When small banks invest more in big banks,
lesser fraction of them default and this is true even when all
of them face large idiosyncratic shocks. These observations
could be specific to the example considered by us, however
we now have a procedure to study complex networks and
a more elaborate study would help us derive more concrete
observations. One can easily generalize the results by relax-
ing many of the assumptions, one can apply this approach
to more applications and these two would be the topics of
future interest.
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5. PROOF OF THEOREM 1
Define a good set as below with psb := E[ηsb1 ]:
B =
{
w :
1
n
∑
j≤n
Wj,b(w)
n→∞→ psb, and
∑
j≤n
1−ηsbj∑
i′≤n Ij,i′
→ 1−psb
pss
}
.
Clearly P (B) = 1 by law of large numbers, under assump-
tions like that in A.2. We begin with a Lemma that discusses
the existence and uniqueness of the aggregate fixed points
and then provide the remaining proof of the theorem. We
consider the following norm for this proof on the space of
infinite sequences, [0, y]∞ × [0, y]:
||(x¯, x¯b − (u¯, u¯b)||∞ = max
{
|x¯b − u¯b|, sup
i
|xi − ui|
}
.
LEMMA 5. Assume 0 < psb < 1 or σ < 1 in A.3. The
n-system (5) as well as the limit system (6) have (aggregate)
fixed points. Fix any w ∈ B. The the limit system f¯∞
for this sample is a strict contraction and hence has unique
fixed point.
Proof: By boundedness assumption A.1 using Brouwer’s
fixed point theorem, the first part is true. For the second
part consider any w ∈ B. From equation (6) and using
assumption A.3, we have for any i:
|f¯∞i (x¯, x¯b)− f¯∞i (u¯, u¯b)|
≤ lim sup
n
∑
j≤n
|ξj(x¯j , x¯b)− ξj(u¯j , u¯b)|Wj,i
≤ ||(x¯, x¯b)− (u¯, u¯b)||∞ lim sup
n
∑
j≤n
Wj,i
= ||(x¯, x¯b)− (u¯, u¯b)||∞(1− psb).
In a similar way
|f¯∞b (x¯, u¯b)− f¯∞b (u¯, u¯b)| ≤ ||(x¯, x¯b)− (u¯, u¯b)||∞psb.
Thus
||f¯∞(x¯, x¯b)− f¯∞(u¯, u¯b)||∞
= max
{
|f¯∞b (x¯, u¯b)− f¯∞b (u¯, u¯b)|, sup
i
|f¯∞i (x¯, u¯b)− f¯∞i (u¯, u¯b)|
}
≤ ||(x¯, x¯b)− (u¯, u¯b)||∞max{1− psb, psb}.
Thus f∞ is a strict contraction mapping with contraction
co-efficient, % := max{1− psb, psb} < 1.
If σ < 1 using similar logic it is clear that not only the limit
system even the system for any finite n is a strict contrac-
tion. 
Define the following function from [0, y]∞×{1, 2, · · · ,∞} →
R+ as below
h(x¯, x¯b, n) = |fnb (x¯, x¯b)− x¯b|+
∑
i≤n
2−i|fni ((x¯, x¯b)− x¯i|,
h(x¯, x¯b,∞) = lim
n→∞ |f
n
b (x¯, x¯b)− x¯b|
+ lim
n→∞
∑
i≤n
2−i|fni ((x¯, x¯b)− x¯i|.
It is clear that the zeros of the above functions are the fixed
points of the mappings f¯n given by (5) for any n ≤ ∞. And
since the systems have fixed points as given by the previous
lemma, these fixed points form the minimizers of the above
functions. Our idea is to obtain the convergence proof us-
ing continuity of optimizers as given by maximum theorem
(e.g., [1, 2]). Towards this we begin with joint continuity of
the objective function.
Joint continuity: First fix an w ∈ B and consider an Nw <
∞ (because of the convergences defined in B), such that for
all n ≥ Nw:
1
n
∑
j
Wj,b ≤ psb + psb
∑
j≤n
1− ηsbj∑
i′≤n Ij,i′
≤ 2 1− psb
pss
.
Thus for all such n we have from equation (1), as Ij,i ≤ 1:
∑
i≤n
2−i
∑
j≤n
Wj,i ≤
∑
i≤n
2−i
∑
j≤n
1− ηsbj∑
i′ Ij,i′
≤
∑
i≤∞
2−i2
1− psb
pss
:= c <∞.
We will show that h is a Lipschitz continuous function for
all such w and that the co-efficient of Lipschitz continuity
can be the same for all n ≥ Nw and for∞. For any (x¯, x¯b)
and (u¯, u¯b) we have for all n > Nw:
|h(x¯, x¯b, n)− h(u¯, u¯b, n)|
≤
∑
i≤n
2−i|f¯ni ((x¯, x¯b)− f¯ni ((u¯, u¯n)|
+|f¯nb (x¯, x¯b)− f¯nb (u¯, u¯b)|+
∑
i≤n
2−i|x¯i − u¯i|+ |x¯b − u¯b|
≤ 2||(x¯, x¯b)− (u¯, u¯b)||∞
∑
i≤n
2−i
∑
j
Wj,i
+||(x¯, x¯b)− (u¯, u¯b)||∞
2 1
n
∑
j
Wj,b + (1 +
∑
i≤n
2−i)

= ||(x¯, x¯b)− (u¯, u¯b)||∞ (2c+ 2psb + 2) .
Using the above, if (x¯n, x¯n,b, n) → (x¯, x¯b,∞), i.e., if
||(x¯n, x¯n,b)− (x¯, x¯b)||∞ → 0 as n→∞, then
|h(x¯n, x¯n,b, n)− h(x¯, x¯b,∞)| → 0,
which implies joint continuity of h.
Weak topology: The unit spheres are not compact, as the
space is infinite dimensional ([1, 2]). So we use the topol-
ogy generated by weak continuity5 The strong continuity
implies continuity in weak sense. Further, the bounded set
[0, y]∞ is weak compact. Now applying maximum theo-
rem to the function h using the topology generated by weak
continuity and when the domain of optimization, [0, y]∞ is
same for all n, we obtain that the set of minimizers of h
form a upper hemi-continuous (with respect to n) compact
correspondence, in the weak sense ([1, 2]). Let the unique
fixed point of the limit system be represented by (x¯∗, x¯∞∗b ).
By properties of upper hemi-continuous (with respect to n)
compact correspondence ([1, 2]) we have the following re-
sult: a) consider any sequence of of numbers nk → ∞ (it
can also be n → ∞); b) consider (any) one fixed point for
each nk, call it
(
x¯∗(nk), x¯∗b(nk)
)
; c) then we have the fol-
lowing weak convergence:(
x¯∗(nk), x¯
∗
b(nk)
)
weakly→
(
x¯∞∗, x¯∞∗b
)
.
Since the projection is a linear functional we have the re-
quired result. The last statement of the theorem is imme-
diate once we have the convergence of the aggregate fixed
points. 
6. MDP - STATE AGGREGATION
Say we have finite number of actions in A. There exists
finite number of groups {Gl}l≤L and if the states of an in-
finite MDP aggregate in the following manner
|
∑
j∈Gl
p(n)(j|i, a)− p(l|k, a)| → 0, i.e.,
5 We say vector (x¯n, x¯nb) converges weakly to (x¯, x¯) ([1,
2]) if
L(x¯n, x¯nb)→ L(x¯, x¯b)
for any linear functional L.
|p(n)(Gl|i, a)− p(l|k, a)| for all i ∈ Gk
and if the immediate rewards also converge
r(n)(i, a) = r(k, a) for all i ∈ Gk.
Then using our theorem we can show that the value func-
tions
v(n)(i) = min
a∈A
{r(i, a) + λ
∑
j
p(n)(j|i, a)v(n)(j)}
converges
v(n)(i)→ v(k) for all i ∈ Gk,
and also the optimal strategy converges
a(n)∗(i)→ a∗(k).
This will be true if the limit system has unique optimizer.
Idea is to use convergence of aggregates
v¯
(n)
i,a :=
∑
j
p(n)(j|i, a)v(n)(j) =
∑
j
p(n)(j|i, a)ξj(v¯(n)j )
where the vector of aggregate for any i is defined as:
v¯
(n)
i := {v¯(n)i,a }a,
and then for all j ∈ Gl
ξj(v¯
(n)
j ) := min
a
{
r(l, a) + v¯
(n)
j,a )
}
.
Appendix: Proof of Lemma 3
Proof of Lemma 3: The big bank does not default hence x∞∗b = y. Therefore we can rewrite the FP equation representing
aggregate clearing vector x¯s∞ as below:
x¯s
∞
1− pbs = min{k
s − vs + x¯s∞, y}w(1− pbs) + min{ks − vs + x¯s∞, y}(1− w)(1− pbs)
+ min{ks − vs + x¯s∞ + y, y}wpbs + min{ks − vs + x¯s∞ + y, y}(1− w)pbs. (13)
It is clear that ks < k
s
and ks < ks + y etc. If y >  then we also have k
s
< ks + y. Then the above FP equation has a
natural order in the following sense: the terms are arranged in increasing order when the corresponding probabilities are not
considered. For example the third term, min{ks − vs + x¯s∞ + y, y} ≤ min{ks − vs + x¯s∞ + y, y}, the fourth term. The
best scenario is with fourth term (small banks receive zero shock and connect with big bank) while the worst is with the first
term (small bank face negative shock and are not connected to big bank).
Case 1: There is no default even in the worst scenario i.e. if
ks − vs + x¯s∞ > y.
Then none of the small banks default leading to P sD = PD1 = 0, and hence the clearing vector satisfies
x¯s
∞
1−pbs = y, or
equivalently x¯s∞ = y(1− pbs). That is Case 1 holds as long as:
ks − vs + y(1− pbs) > y or equivalently as long as ypbs < ks − vs. (14)
However as pbs increases, the above may not be true and this gives us the bound b1 = ks − vs.
Case 2 When there is default only in the first term of (13), i.e., when P sD(pbs) = PD2(pbs) = w(1 − pbs). The aggregate
clearing vector in this case satisfies:
x¯s
∞
1− pbs = (k
s − vs + x¯s∞)PD2 + y(1− PD2)
⇒ x¯s∞ = y(1− pbs)− (ypbs − c2) (1− pbs)PD2(pbs)
1− (1− pbs)PD2(pbs) where c2 = k
s − vs.
The Case 2 holds as long as
ks − vs + x¯s∞ < y and ks − vs + x¯s∞ > y. (15)
Once again as pbs increases, the above may not be true (the second inequality can fail) and this gives us the bound b2. The
bound b2 can be obtained:
k
s − vs + x¯s∞ = y ⇒ ypbs = (ks − vs)PD2(1− pbs) + (ks − vs)(1− (1− pbs)PD2)
⇒ ypbs = c2PD2(1− pbs) + d2(1− (1− pbs)PD2) where d2 = ks − vs.
Thus bound, b2 = c2PD2(1− pbs) + d2(1− (1− pbs)PD2).
Case 3 When there is default only in the first two terms of (13), i.e., when P sD(pbs) = PD3(pbs) = (1− pbs). The aggregate
clearing vector in this case satisfies:
x¯s
∞
1− pbs = (k
s − vs + x¯s∞)w(1− pbs) + (ks − vs + x¯s∞)(1− w)(1− pbs) + y(1− PD3).
This implies
x¯s
∞ = y(1− pbs)− (ypbs − c3) (1− pbs)PD3(pbs)
1− (1− pbs)PD3(pbs) where c3 = K¯
s
Z − vs. (16)
The Case 3 holds as long as
k
s − vs + x¯s∞ < y and ks − vs + x¯s∞ + y > y. (17)
Using (16) one can easily show that that x¯s∞ is decreasing with increase in pbs. Thus again as pbs increases, the above
inequalities (second one) may not be true and this gives us the bound b3. The bound b3 can be obtained:
ks − vs + x¯s∞ + y = y ⇒ ypbs = c3PD3(1− pbs) + d3(1− (1− pbs)PD3)
⇒ ypbs = c3PD3(1− pbs) + d3(1− (1− pbs)PD3) where d3 = ks − vs + y.
Thus bound, b3 = c3PD3(1− pbs) + d3(1− (1− pbs)PD3).
Continuing this way one can obtain all the subcases of the Lemma.

